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Abstract
We consider the power of various quantum complexity classes with
the restriction that states and operators are defined over a real, rather
than complex, Hilbert space. It is well know that a quantum circuit over
the complex numbers can be transformed into a quantum circuit over the
real numbers with the addition of a single qubit. This implies that BQP
retains its power when restricted to using states and operations over the
reals. We show that the same is true for QMA(k), QIP(k), QMIP, and
QSZK.
1 Introduction
The standard quantum formalism specifies a complex Hilbert space, but one
could just as well consider a real Hilbert space. In fact, a quantum formalism
based on real Hilbert spaces has the same descriptive power as complex quantum
formalism: given any description of a physical system using complex quantum
formalism, there is a simple mapping to a description over real Hilbert spaces,
called the real simulation, that gives the same predicted outcome statistics.
Moreover, this mapping respects the division into subsystems [MMG09]. This
means, for example, that there can be no experiment that can rule out real
quantum formalism.1
Now let us consider computational complexity. Does the choice of real or
complex Hilbert spaces change the power of various computing models? At first
it might seem that this is obvious: if any quantum system can be described
using real Hilbert spaces, then why not the physical systems underlying some
computing model? For computing models where all parties are trusted this is
indeed the case. BQP, EQP and related classes are all unchanged as well as
classes where messages are classical, such at QCMA.
1Unless one makes assumptions about the dimension of systems.
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In the case of interactive proofs, however, the situation is more complicated.
Mapping some complex interactive proof protocol into a real proof protocol
gives the same completeness, but it might give more power to a cheating prover.
As well, even if we lift a real proof protocol into a complex protocol there are
more operations available to a cheating prover. Hence, on the face of it, there
is no obvious relationship between complexity classes defined over complex or
real Hilbert spaces. However, we will show that, in many interesting cases,
restricting to real Hilbert spaces does not change the power of a complexity
class.
1.1 Definitions
For an introduction to complexity theory and interactive proofs, see [AB09].
Here we recall the definitions of several complexity classes.
Definition 1. QMIP[m, k][KM03] is the set of languages which can be verified
by a polynomial time quantum verifier interacting with m non-communicating
quantum provers, exchanging k messages, which accepts inputs in the language
with probability at least 2/3 (completeness) and accepts inputs not in the lan-
guage with probability no more than 1/3 (soundness). Further,
• QMIPne[m, k] is the same as QMIP[m, k] with the additional restriction
that the provers do not share prior entanglement.
• QIP(k) = QMIP[1, k] [Wat99]
• QMA = QIP(1) [Wat00]
• QMA(k) = QMIPne[k, 1] [KMY01]
Note that the completeness and soundness values can be set to any con-
stants, with completeness larger than soundness, without changing the com-
plexity classes. Also, since there is no advantage in the verifier sending the final
message, by convention the provers always send the final message, so that if k
is odd the provers send the first message, otherwise the verifier sends the first
message.
Definition 2. QSZK [Wat02] is the subset of languages QIP with the additional
restriction that, for an honest prover, the state ρx,j consisting of the verifier’s
state and all message registers after j rounds of interaction of the proof system
with input x satisfies
||ρx,j − σx,j || ≤ δ(|x|) (1)
for all x in the language, and all j or some function δ which is bounded above
by 1/p(n) for all polynomials p(n) for sufficiently large n, where σx,j are the
outputs of a uniform family of polynomially sized circuits.
Essentially, this definition says that a verifier does not gain any information
by interacting with the prover that it could not have discovered through a
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polynomial-time computation on its own. Note that QSZK does not change if we
restrict to honest verifiers or we allow them to deviate from the protocol[Wat09].
For any quantum complexity class let us define a restricted class such that
all states and operators are defined over the real numbers instead of the complex
numbers. We name these classes by adding a subscript R. Thus BQP restricted
to real gates and states becomes BQPR, etc.. We also place the same restriction
on provers for the interactive complexity classes.
We might also consider the case where the provers are allowed to be complex.
However, it is our intention to consider the computational complexity of various
classes where the entire underlying vector space is real, rather than test the
power of a real verifier. However, as a consequence of our work it does not
change the power if the prover is allowed to be real or complex. Indeed, when
considering cheating provers we will frequently relax the definition to allow
complex provers as a simplification.
1.2 Contributions
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.
QMA = QMAR (2)
QMA(k) = QMAR(k) (3)
QIP(k) = QIPR(k) (4)
QMIP[m, k] = QMIPR[m, k] (5)
QMIPne[m, k] ⊆ QMIPneR[m, k + 1] (6)
QMIPneR[m, k] ⊆ QMIPne[m, k + 1] (7)
QSZK = QSZKR. (8)
For each class C we must prove both containments: C ⊆ CR and CR ⊆ C.
For the first case we use the real simulation, which preserves completeness. We
show that soundness is also preserved by using an argument from [MM11], orig-
inally used for security. To show CR ⊆ C we lift a real protocol into analogous
complex Hilbert spaces. This preserves completeness directly. To show that
soundness is also preserved we apply the real simulation to a cheating prover.
In addition to the basic arguments above, there are several special cases. For
QMA(2), we cannot use the usual real simulation because it introduces entan-
glement between provers. For this we must develop a different real simulation
which does not require entanglement. A similar problem, but different solution,
occurs for QMIPne. Finally, for QSZK we must take into account the additional
requirement that an honest prover does not leak too much information to a
verifier. This requires us to reverse the real simulation process and construct
an efficient complex circuit from a real circuit.
3
2 Real simulation
In this section we recall the relevant work on real simulation of arbitrary quan-
tum systems over complex Hilbert spaces. In particular, we recall the real
simulation of quantum circuits and multi-party computations. Additionally, we
introduce the separable simulation for the case where the original multi-party
measurement is separable. Finally, we introduce the “reverse” mapping to ob-
tain complex circuits from real circuits.
2.1 Single party
It is a well known result that any quantum circuit can be simulated over a
real Hilbert space by using one additional qubit. The basic idea is to store
the 2-dimensional real vector space represented by a complex number in a 2-
dimensional real vector space corresponding to the additional qubit added to
the circuit. It is quite easy to derive the transformation needed to take states
and gates over a complex Hilbert spaces to states and gates over real Hilbert
space.
Definition 3. Let A be a complex Hilbert space, and Q = H2 be a 2-dimensional
Hilbert space. Let R : A → Q⊗A be defined by
R(|ψ〉A) = |0〉QRe|ψ〉A + |1〉QIm|ψ〉A. (9)
where Q⊗A is taken as a real Hilbert space. Further, R is extended to the dual
space by R(〈ψ|) = R(|ψ〉)† and to matrices by R(|ψ〉〈φ|) = R(|ψ〉)R(〈φ|) and by
the fact R(aM + bN) = aR(M) + bR(N) where a, b ∈ R and M,N are complex
matrices.
R(·) has several interesting properties, summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let M , N be linear operators over a Hilbert space A and |ψ〉, |φ〉 ∈
H. Further, define VQ by
VQ =
1√
2
(
1 1
−i i
)
Q
. (10)
Then
V †QR(M)VQ = |0〉〈0|Q ⊗MA + |1〉〈1|Q ⊗M∗A (11)
V †QR(|ψ〉) =
1√
2
|0〉Q|ψ〉A +
1√
2
|1〉Q|ψ∗〉A (12)
R(MN) = R(M)R(N) (13)
R(M |ψ〉) = R(M)R(|ψ〉) (14)
R(〈ψ|)R(M)R(|φ〉) = Re〈ψ|M |φ〉 (15)
Also, R(M) is unitary (Hermitian, positive semi-definite) if and only if M
is unitary (Hermitian, positive semi-definite).
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For further details, including proofs, see [McK10]. A straightforward conse-
quence of the lemma is that if we transform the input state, each unitary and
each measurement in a circuit by R(·), then we obtain the same distribution on
measurement outcomes as in the original circuit. The circuit thus obtained is
called the real simulation. Using the real simulation we learn that BQPR = BQP.
The cost incurred for using the simulation is one qubit. Note, however, that
this “extra” qubit Q has a rather important role, and is needed to perform any
unitary R(U) when U has complex entries.
Although it is not necessary for the simulation to work, we introduce the
unitary VQ since it will be useful later on. By changing the basis by VQ we
can view the real simulation as a coherent mixture of the original computation
and its complex conjugate. Also, in this basis it is quite obvious that the real
simulation produces the same statistics as the original circuit.
2.2 Multiple parties
Suppose that we have some computation that happens between multiple parties
and we wish to simulate the computation over real numbers instead of complex.
Furthermore, we need the simulation to respect the original division into mul-
tiple parties. A good example is Bell tests, where we wish to show that real
states and measurements can violate a Bell inequality by the same amount as
complex states and measurements. To accomplish this, we give a “copy” of Q
to each party.
Definition 4. For j = 1 . . .m let Aj be a complex Hilbert spaces, and Qj = H2
be a 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Let R(m) :
⊗
j Aj →
⊗
j Qj ⊗Hj be defined
by
R(m)(|ψ〉) = VQ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ VQm
(
1√
2
|00 . . . 0〉Q1...Qm |ψ〉A1...Am+
1√
2
|11 . . . 1〉Q1...Qm |ψ∗〉A1...Am
)
(16)
and analogously for R(m)(〈ψ|). For operators we define R(m)j (·) by
V †QjR
(m)
j (MAj )VQj = |0〉〈0|Qj ⊗MAj + |1〉〈1|Qj ⊗M∗Aj (17)
From the definition it is immediately clear that transforming a circuit by
R(m) preserves statistics, since it essentially produces a mixture of the original
circuit and its complex conjugate. As well, R(m) and R
(m)
j produce states and
operators with real amplitudes and matrix entries. We obtain the following
properties of R(m)(·).
Lemma 2. Let j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} MAj , NAk be linear operators. Further, let
|ψ〉 ∈⊗j Aj. Then
R(m)(MAjNAk |ψ〉) = R(m)j (MAj )R(m)k (NAk)R(m)(|ψ〉) (18)
R(m)(〈ψ|)R(m)j (MAj )R(m)(|ψ〉) = Re〈ψ|MAj |ψ〉 (19)
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R
(m)
j (MAj ) is unitary (Hermitian, positive semi-definite) if and only if MAj
is unitary (Hermitian, positive semi-definite). Finally, R(m)(|ψ〉) is a real vec-
tor, and R
(m)
j (MAj ) is a matrix with real entries.
For detailed proofs of these facts, we refer the reader to [McK10] section
2.5.4. The proof proceeds in a fashion similar to that of lemma 1.
2.3 Separable states and operations
For this section we focus on states and measurement observables only, which is
sufficient for our application in section 3.3. The techniques should be adaptable
to separable superoperators as well.
Suppose that we have a computation with multiple subsystems which is
separable. That is, the state and observables can all be written in the form
M =
∑
k
MA1,k ⊗ · · · ⊗MAm,k (20)
where each MAj ,k and M are all Hermitian. For pure states, we require that
the corresponding density matrix is separable, i.e. that the state is a product
state. To simulate general multi-partite computations the construction given in
section 2.2 is required, and in particular this means that the state will be entan-
gled across subsystems. However, in the case where the state and measurement
are separable, the entanglement is not necessary.
We will use similar methodology to that in the previous section, by con-
sidering coherent mixtures of the original and complex conjugate computation.
The structure of the separable operator allows us to complex conjugate only
one subsystem in a well defined way. In the case of many subsystems, we can
conjugate on a subset which we specify by way of a bit-string.
Definition 5 (Partial complex conjugation). Let M =
∑
kMA1,k⊗· · ·⊗MAm,k
be a separable operator. Then
M∗j =
∑
k
MA1,k ⊗ · · · ⊗M∗Aj ,k ⊗ · · · ⊗MAm,k. (21)
Let |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 . . . |ψm〉 be a product state. Then
|ψ〉∗j = |ψ1〉 . . . |ψj〉∗ . . . |ψm〉. (22)
Further, define M∗z for z ∈ {0, 1}m to be M with (·)∗k applied for each j such
that zj = 1 (Note that the order does not matter) and analogously for |ψ〉∗z .
Just as the complex conjugation preserves outcome statistics, partial com-
plex conjugation also preserves statistics.
Lemma 3. Let M =
∑
jMA1,j⊗· · ·⊗MAm,j and N =
∑
kNA1,k⊗· · ·⊗NAm,k
be separable operators. Then
Tr(MN) = Tr(M∗zN∗z) (23)
for all z ∈ {0, 1}m.
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Proof. Note that it suffices to show Tr(MN) = Tr(M∗tN∗t) for t ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
since we may apply induction to obtain the full result. As well, it suffices to
show the result for m = 2 and t = 1 since we may permute systems and combine
m− 1 of the systems into one to reduce to this case.
Tr(MN) = Tr

∑
j,k
MA1,j ⊗MA2,jNA1,k ⊗NA2,k

 (24)
=
∑
j,k
Tr(MA1,jNA1,k)Tr(MA2,jNA2,k) (25)
=
∑
j,k
Tr(MA1,jNA1,k)
∗
Tr(MA2,jNA2,k) (26)
=
∑
j,k
Tr((MA1,j)
∗(NA1,k)
∗)Tr(MA2,jNA2,k) (27)
= Tr

∑
j,k
(MA1, j)∗ ⊗MA2,j(NA1,k)∗ ⊗NA2,k

 (28)
= Tr(M∗A1N∗A1 ) . (29)
Here the third line follows from the fact that MA1,j and NA1,k are Hermitian,
hence complex conjugation does not change the trace.
We are now ready to define the real simulation for a separable computation.
We will consider the case of two subsystems, but the same techniques generalize
for any number of subsystems.
Definition 6. Define R
(2)
1,2 : A1 ⊗A2 → Q1 ⊗A1 ⊗Q2 ⊗A2 by
R
(2)
1,2(|ψ1〉|ψ2〉) = R(2)1 (|ψ1〉)⊗R(2)2 (|ψ2〉) (30)
Where R
(2)
1 and R
(2)
2 are both R as in section 2.1, with R
(2)
j : Aj → Qj ⊗Aj .
For operators we define
R
(2)
1,2(M) =
∑
k
R
(2)
1 (MA1,k)⊗R(2)2 (MA2,k) (31)
We obtain the following properties:
Lemma 4. Let M be a separable operator over a Hilbert space A = A1 ⊗ A2.
7
Further, let |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 ∈ A. Then∑
z∈{0,1}2
|z〉〈z|Q1Q2 ⊗M∗zA =
(
V †Q1 ⊗ V
†
Q2
)
R
(m)
1,2 (M) (VQ1 ⊗ VQ2) (32)
V †Q1 ⊗ V
†
Q2R
(2)
1,2(|ψ〉) =
1
2
(|0〉Q1 |ψ1〉A1 + |1〉Q1 |ψ∗1〉A1)⊗ (33)(|0〉Q2 |ψ2〉A2 + |1〉Q2 |ψ∗2〉A2)
〈ψ|MA|ψ〉 = R(2)1,2(〈ψ|)R(2)1,2(MA)R(2)1,2(|ψ〉) (34)
Proof. The first two properties follow directly from the definition and lemma 1.
For the last property, first we decomposeM into a sum of product operators
from which we calculate the left side as∑
k
〈ψ1|MA1,k|ψ1〉〈ψ2|MA2,k|ψ2〉. (35)
Meanwhile, using the first two properties, the right hand side becomes
1
4
∑
k
〈ψ1|MA1,k|ψ1〉〈ψ2|MA2,k|ψ2〉+ 〈ψ∗1 |M∗A1,k|ψ∗1〉〈ψ2|MA2,k|ψ2〉+
〈ψ1|MA1,k|ψ1〉〈ψ∗2 |M∗A2,k|ψ∗2〉+ 〈ψ∗1 |M∗A1,k|ψ∗1〉〈ψ∗2 |M∗A2,k|ψ∗2〉. (36)
Since each MAj ,k is Hermitian and
〈
ψ∗j
∣∣M∗Aj ,k∣∣ψ∗j 〉 = (〈ψj |MAj ,k|ψj〉)∗, all the
summands are in fact equal, and we obtain equality with the left hand side.
2.4 Inverse transformation
We now consider a type of inverse of R(·) in the case of a single system. First,
note that any real state |ψ′〉 that has a qubit register Q can be written as
|ψ′〉 = |0〉Q|ψ0〉A + |1〉Q|ψ1〉A (37)
and the state |ψ〉 = |ψ0〉 + i|ψ1〉 satisfies R(|ψ〉) = |ψ′〉. Now, suppose that we
have an efficient real circuit which outputs |ψ′〉. Does this imply that there is
an efficient circuit which outputs |ψ〉? Indeed it does.
Lemma 5. Let an n-qubit unitary U , implemented as a polynomial sized circuit,
be given such that
U |0〉⊗n = |ψ′〉 = |0〉|ψ0〉+ |1〉|ψ1〉 (38)
where |ψ′〉 is real. Then there exists an (n + 1)-qubit unitary U ′, implemented
as a polynomial sized circuit, such that
U ′|0〉⊗n+1 = |00〉 (|ψ0〉+ i|ψ1〉) = |ψ〉 (39)
8
|0〉 • • • H
|0〉
W
•
W † N W
|0〉⊗(n−1)
Figure 1: Rewinding U
Proof. We use the “quantum rewinding” trick due to Watrous [Wat09]. First
we use VQ1 , defined as in previous sections and applied to the first qubit, to
form W = V †Q1U , so
W |0〉⊗n = 1√
2
(|0〉|ψ〉+ |1〉|ψ∗〉) . (40)
Next, let |φ〉 be defined by
|φ〉 =W † 1√
2
(|0〉|ψ〉 − |1〉|ψ∗〉) . (41)
Note that 〈0⊗n|φ〉 = 0.
Finally, let N be given by:
N |x〉 =
{
|x〉 x = 0
−|x〉 x 6= 0. (42)
N can be implemented by a polynomially sized circuit, for example using the
standard construction for gates controlled on many qubits given in [NC00], figure
4.10.
Now we construct U ′ as in the circuit given in figure 1. After the first two
gates we obtain the state
1√
2
(|00〉|ψ〉+ |11〉|ψ∗〉) (43)
and after the controlled W †, the state
1√
2
(
|00〉|ψ〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
(
|0〉⊗n − |φ〉
))
. (44)
The controlled N gate takes |φ〉 to −|φ〉, and we obtain
1√
2
(
|ψ〉|00〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
(
|0〉⊗n + |φ〉
))
. (45)
Finally, applying the final controlled W and H , the state becomes
|0〉|0〉|ψ〉. (46)
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Recall that we can take a polynomial sized circuit for W and construct a
polynomial sized circuit for a controlled-W and controlled-W † using standard
techniques [NC00]. The circuit in figure 1 is hence also polynomial sized.
3 Complexity implications
The real simulation for single systems and lemma 1 immediately imply that
BQP = BQPR, EQP = EQPR and QCMA = QCMAR (interactive proofs with a
single classical message and a quantum verifier). We show that the analogous
results are also true for QMA, QMA(2), QIP, MQIP and QSZK.
3.1 Imaginary measurements
Before we begin, we first discuss a proof technique which we will make frequent
use of, which is to imagine that certain measurements have been performed.
In particular, we will frequently make use of equation (11) or the analogous
equations for the multipartite and separable real simulations. These equations
show that the simulation operators all have a particular form which commutes
with the operator iVQZV
†
Q = YQ. If, for example, the verifier is a real simulation
the all its operators commute with YQ so we can in principle measure YQ at
any time without affecting the outcome of the calculation. Although invisible
from the perspective of the outcome of the computation, these measurements
impose a structure on the state which we can take advantage of. In particular,
due to the form in equation (11), the outcome of a YQ measurement dictates
whether a simulation operator behaves like the original operator, or its complex
conjugate.
We use this technique as follows. We begin with a calculation C which
accepts with probability p. We note that C commutes with a measurement Y
so we imagine a new calculation C′ in which the measurement Y is performed at
some point. Since Y commutes with C, C′ also accepts with probability p. Now
we use the additional structure imposed on C′ to show that C′ accepts with
probability less than s (or greater than c, depending on what we are proving),
and hence p ≤ s. Finally, we see that C accepts with probability less than s.
This basic argument will be used repeatedly for the different complexity
classes.
3.2 QMIP
Interestingly, we must first show that, by limiting to real numbers, we do not
actually increase the power of a complexity class. Imagine a real verifier en-
gaging in a protocol with a real prover. If we then allow the prover access to
a complex Hilbert space, it has access to a larger set of operations and may
be able to cheat against the real verifier with higher probability. Hence that
there could be problems in QMIP[m, k]R that are not in QMIP[m, k]. However,
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as we shall see, this is not the case and in fact QMIP[m, k]R ⊆ QMIP[m, k]. By
substituting in suitable values of m and k we obtain the analogous result for
QIP, and QMA. We leave QMA(2), QMIPne and QSZK as special cases.
Lemma 6.
QMIP[m, k]R ⊆ QMIP[m, k] (47)
Proof. Suppose that we have a verifierA(x) for some language L in QMIP[m, k]R.
Now we lift A(x) to a complex Hilbert space. Clearly all states in the real
Hilbert space can also be lifted to the complex Hilbert space, so the soundness
and completeness cannot go down in the complex setting. Now let a set of
complex provers Pj(x) be given that cause A(x) to accept with probability p.
We can construct a different set of provers P ′j(x) and verifier A
′(x) by using
the multi-party real simulation from section 2.2. However, since each of A(x)’s
operations M is real, the image R
(m+1)
m+1 (M) has the form IQm+1 ⊗M . In fact,
the new verifier does not need Q1 at all and we can take A′(x) = A(x).
Now the provers in P ′j(x) are all real. They must begin with an entangled
state, but this is allowed in the definition of QMIP[m, k]. As mentioned above,
A(x) does not need access to the entangled state on Q1 for the simulation to
work. Now when the provers P ′j(x) interact with A(x) they cause it to accept
with probability p, i.e.with the same probability as the complex provers Pj(x).
This shows that the completeness and soundness cannot go up when we lift A(x)
to the complex setting. Thus QMIP[m, k]R ⊆ QMIP[m, k].
Lemma 7.
QMIP[m, k] ⊆ QMIP[m, k]R (48)
Proof. Here we have two tasks: show how to use the real simulation from sec-
tion 2.2 to keep the same completeness, and prove that the soundness is also
preserved. As in the previous section by substituting in suitable values ofm and
k we obtain the analogous result for QIP, and QMA and leave QMA(2), QMIPne
and QSZK as special cases.
We begin with a complex verifier A(x) and provers Pj(x) for some protocol.
We can apply the real simulation to find real verifier A′(x) and provers P ′j(x).
We need to distribute the entangled state in registers Q1 . . .Qm+1 to all the
parties. In the case where k is odd, so that the provers go first, they may begin
with the state already shared. Prover 1 begins with registersQ1 and Qm+1, and
sends Qm+1 to the verifier in the first message. If k is even, then the verifier
prepares the all the Q registers and sends Qj to prover j in the first message,
keeping Qm+1 for himself. In this way we have constructed a real protocol with
the same completeness as the original complex protocol.
We now show that the above construction preserves soundness. For this
argument we consider everything over complex numbers. Note that this only
gives more power to the provers, and can only increase the soundness. Recall
from section 2.2 that there exists a local change of basis VQm+1 such that an
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operator M applied by the verifier becomes
V †Qm+1RQm+1(M)VQm+1 = |0〉〈0|Qm+1 ⊗M + |1〉〈1|Qm+1M∗. (49)
Hence in the real protocol all operations commute with iVQm+1ZV
†
Qm+1 =
YQm+1 . There is no difference, then, if we measure YQm+1 so we may imag-
ine that the verifier does so before any other operations.
Now we come to the crux of the argument. As above, after changing ba-
sis by VQm+1 each operation M
′ of the verifier A′(x) looks like a controlled
operation, with the control on Qm+1. So if the YQm+1 measurement outcome
was “0” then the verifier performs M as in the original complex protocol, and
the overall behaviour of A′(x) is the same as A(x). If the outcome was “1”
then the verifier performs M∗ and the behaviour is that of A∗(x), the complex
conjugate of A(x). Clearly in both cases the soundness is the same as for the
original verifier A(x) and we have merely taken a convex combination through
the YQm+1 measurement. Hence in the real protocol the soundness is identical
to the original complex verifier A(x).
One might wonder whether the multiparty real simulation is necessary in the
case of QIP. Since the verifier and prover take turns they could communicate a
single “extra” qubit back and forth. In fact, this is not sufficient. In A we give
an explicit example where the soundness of such a construction is not the same
as in the original protocol.
3.3 QMA(k)
We begin with a language L ∈ QMA(k). For input x ∈ L we may model the
verifier A(x) as the positive semi-definite operator (POVM element) such that
P (ACCEPT) = 〈ψ1| . . . 〈ψk|A(x)|ψ1〉 . . . |ψk〉 (50)
We recall a recent result of Harrow and Montanaro [HM10] wherein the au-
thors prove that QMA(k) = QMASEP(2). Here QMASEP(2) is QMA(2) with the
additional restriction that A(x) is separable across the message registers from
the two provers. Harrow and Montanaro give an explict contstruction for two
provers and a separable verifier from k provers and an arbitrary verifier. For
our purposes we also need the equality QMAR(k) = QMA
SEP
R
(2), which can be
seen by noting that Harrow and Montanaro’s construction does not introduce
any complex numbers, hence real verifiers remain real. From this, it suffices to
show QMASEP(2) = QMA(2)
SEP
R
.
Recall from the definition of QMA(k) that the provers must send unentan-
gled states. Thus we are in the situation of an unentangled state and separa-
ble measurement, described in section 2.3. We proceed in two steps, showing
QMASEP(2) and QMA(2)SEP
R
contain eachother.
Lemma 8.
QMA(2)SEP
R
⊆ QMA(2)SEP (51)
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Proof. Let A(x) =
∑
k Ak(x) ⊗ Bk(x) be a separable verifier for a language
L ∈ QMA(2)SEP
R
. The A and B operators act on the two message registers from
the two provers, respectively. For some state |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 we lift A(x) and |ψ1〉|ψ2〉
to a complex Hilbert space and note that the probability of acceptance is the
same. Hence the soundness and completeness cannot go down in the complex
setting.
Now we prove that soundness and completeness cannot go up. Suppose A(x)
accepts a complex state ρA ⊗ ρB (where A and B registers come from the first
and second provers, respectively) with probability p. We may write ρA and ρB
as real and imaginary parts, obtaining
p =
∑
k
Tr
(
Ak(x)ρ
R
A
)
Tr
(
Bk(x)ρ
R
B
)
+ iTr
(
Ak(x)ρ
R
A
)
Tr
(
Bk(x)ρ
I
B
)
(52)
+iTr
(
Ak(x)ρ
I
A
)
Tr
(
Bk(x)ρ
R
B
)− Tr(Ak(x)ρIA)Tr(Bk(x)ρIB)
where ρRA and ρ
R
B are real symmetric and ρ
I
A and ρ
I
B are real anti-symmetric
((ρIA)ab = −(ρIA)ba). It is easy to show that Tr(MN) = 0 whenever M is sym-
metric and N is anti-symmetric, so the last three terms in the above summation
are all zero, and
p =
∑
k
Tr
(
Ak(x)ρ
R
A
)
Tr
(
Bk(x)ρ
R
B
)
=
∑
k
Tr
(
Ak(x)⊗Bk(x)ρRA ⊗ ρRB
)
(53)
We can then decompose ρRA and ρ
R
B into mixtures of pure states and, by con-
vexity, obtain at least one real pure state |φ〉A|φ〉B which the verifier will
accept with probability at least p. Hence the soundness and completeness
cannot increase when lifting the real verifier into the complex setting, and
QMAR(2)
SEP ⊆ QMA(2)SEP.
Lemma 9.
QMA(2)SEP
R
⊇ QMA(2)SEP (54)
Proof. Let L be a laungage in QMA(k)SEP with separable verifier A(x), which
has completeness c and soundness s. Suppose there exists a valid proof |ψ1〉|ψ2〉.
Applying the simulation in section 2.3 prover 1 can send R
(2)
1 (|ψ1〉) while prover
2 can send R
(2)
2 (|ψ2〉). Meanwhile, the verifier becomes R(2)1,2(A(x)) since it is
separable. We then have
R
(2)
1 (〈ψ1|)R(2)2 (〈ψ2|)R(2)1,2(A(x))R1(|ψ1〉)R(2)2 (|ψ2〉) = 〈ψ1|〈ψ2|A(x)|ψ1〉|ψ2〉 ≥ c
(55)
so the completeness of R
(2)
1,2(A(x)) is again c.
To analyze soundness we use an argument analogous to the QMIP case.
Suppose that some x is not in L, so 〈ψ|A(x)|ψ〉 ≤ s for all |ψ〉. By lemma 4
V †Q1 ⊗ V
†
Q2R
(2)
1,2(A(x))VQ1 ⊗ VQ2 =
∑
z∈{0,1}2
|z〉〈z|Q1Q2 ⊗A(x)∗z . (56)
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Thus measuring iVQ1ZV
†
Q1 = YQ1 commutes with R
(2)
1,2(A(x)) and we may imag-
ine that this measurement happens, and in particular that prover 1 measures
before sending the state. Similarly, we may imagine that prover 2 measures Q2
in the basis YQ2 . Equivalently, the provers might as well have sent a mixture of
VQ1 |j〉Q1 |ψj〉VQ2 |k〉Q2 |φk〉 for j, k ∈ {0, 1} and for some complex |ψj〉 and |φk〉.
Note that the resulting mixture need not be real, but by considering complex
states we only increase the power of the cheating provers. The probability of
accepting is then a convex combination of the form∑
z∈{0,1}2
pz〈ψz1 |〈φz2 |A∗z (x)|ψz1〉|φz2〉. (57)
By lemma 3 and the soundness of A(x), each term 〈ψz1 |〈φz2 |A∗z (x)|ψz1〉|φz2〉 is
at most s and hence by convexity the overall acceptance probability is at most
s. Thus R
(2)
1,2(A(x)) is a verifier with the same completeness and soundness as
A(x) and we have proved that QMASEP(2) ⊆ QMA(2)SEP
R
.
We should point out that, unlike the proof for QMIP, here we are not allowed
to simulate just any protocol for a QMA(k) problem. It must first be transformed
into QMASEP(2) protocol before the mapping to a real protocol is applied.
3.4 QMIPneR
For the case of non-entangled provers we need to make small adjustments which,
in some cases, increase the number of messages by 1.
Lemma 10.
QMIPneR[m, k] ⊆ QMIPne[m, k + 1] (58)
Proof. Here the argument follows that in section 3.2. However, there is a prob-
lem which arises when we find the multi-party simulation of a set of cheating
provers. Since entanglement is required, and the provers do not start with any,
it must be provided by the verifier. Thus we add an additional message at the
start of the protocol where the verifier prepares Q1 . . .Qm+1 in the necessary
state and sends Qj to prover j. This allows the simulation to proceed and
increases the number of messages by at most 1.
We have potentially created a problem by handing over entanglement to the
provers. However, the verifier keeps Qm+1 so that the state that the provers
have, once Qm+1 traced out, is just a shared random bit. In particular, the
provers share a mixture of VQ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ VQm 1√2 |00 . . . 0〉Q1...Qm and VQ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
VQm
1√
2
|11 . . . 1〉Q1...Qm . This shared random bit can only allow the provers to
take a convex combination of strategies, not increase the maximum cheating
probability. Hence giving the provers the entanglement in this way does not
give any additional power to them.
Lemma 11.
QMIPne[m, k] ⊆ QMIPneR[m, k + 1] (59)
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Proof. The argument is the same as in the case when entanglement is allowed,
except that we need to establish the necessary entanglement between provers.
If the verifier goes first, then it prepares Q1 . . .Qm+1 in the necessary state
sends Qj to prover j along with the first message. If not, then we insert a new
message at the beginning of the protocol that does just this, and increases the
number of messages by 1.
3.5 QSZK
QSZK is essentially QIP with the additional restriction that, assuming an honest
prover, any state the verifier can create while interacting with the prover must
be close in trace distance to the output of some efficient quantum circuit. We
need only verify this additional condition since completeness and soundness are
dealt with in the QIP case.
First, we need a lemma about the real simulation:
Lemma 12. Let |ψ〉AB and |φ〉AB be a bipartite complex states and |ψ′〉ABQ =
R(|ψ〉), |φ′〉ABQ = R(|φ〉) be the real simulation states. Let
ρ = TrA(|ψ〉〈ψ|)
σ = TrA(|φ〉〈φ|)
ρ′ = TrAQ(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)
σ′ = TrAQ(|φ′〉〈φ′|)
Then
||ρ− σ||1 ≤ ||ρ′ − σ′||1 (60)
Proof. First we transform the real states by V †Q, which does not change the trace
distance. From now on we implicitly assume this change of basis has occurred.
After this change of basis we find
ρ′ =
1
2
(
ρ00 ρ01
ρ10 ρ11
)
(61)
with ρ00 = ρ
∗
11 = ρ since |ψ′〉 = 1√2 (|0〉|ψ〉+ |1〉|ψ∗〉). Now consider the super-
operator Φ(·) which measures the Q register in the ZQ eigenbasis and records
the result back into the Q register. Then Φ(·) just zeros out the off-diagonal
blocks, and
Φ(ρ′) =
1
2
(
ρ 0
0 ρ∗
)
(62)
and analogously
Φ(σ′) =
1
2
(
σ 0
0 σ∗
)
(63)
Next we make two observations. First, since superoperators cannot increase the
trace distance ||Φ(ρ′)− Φ(σ′)||1 ≤ ||ρ′ − σ′||1. Second, since we can diagonalize
the two blocks on the diagonal separately, and complex conjugation does not
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change the norm, ||Φ(ρ′)− Φ(σ′)||1 = ||ρ− σ||1. Hence ||ρ− σ||1 ≤ ||ρ′ − σ′||1 .
Lemma 13.
QSZKR ⊆ QSZK (64)
Proof. Let A(x) be a real verifier for a language in QSZKR, which we lift to
a complex Hilbert space. Note that the completeness and soundness do not
change, as shown in section 3.2, so we just need to show that a real cheating
verifier cannot trick a honest real prover P into revealing too much information.
Let W be some polynomially sized complex circuit which interacts with P
and which outputs state |ψ〉AB on some output qubits B and non-output qubits
A. We assume thatA includes any part of the state that P keeps. Then consider
ρ = TrA(|ψ〉〈ψ|). We can form circuit W ′ and state |ψ′〉ABQ by applying R(·).
Note that P is not changed (besides adding an identity on Q) since it is real.
The output state of the real circuit is ρ′ = TrA(|ψ′〉〈ψ′|).
From the definition ofQSZKR, there must be some state σ
′ such that ||ρ′ − σ′||1 ≤
c, and σ′ = TrA(|φ′〉〈φ′|) where |φ′〉AB is the output of some polynomially sized
circuit U ′, not involving P . By lemma 5 there is a polynomially sized circuit
U (which also does not interact with P ) which outputs complex state |φ〉 such
that R(|φ〉) = |φ′〉. After tracing out non-output qubits the state becomes
σ = TrA(|φ〉〈φ|). Finally, by lemma 12
||ρ− σ||1 ≤ ||ρ′ − σ′||1 ≤ c. (65)
Hence we have shown that any state that a complex cheating verifier can create
by interacting with P is close to a state that can be efficiently created not using
P .
Lemma 14.
QSZKR ⊇ QSZK (66)
Proof. Structure of the prover Let A(x) be the verifier for some language
L ∈ QSZK, and let P (x) be the corresponding honest prover. We use the same
construction as for QIP ⊆ QIPR, from which we obtain a real verifier A′(x) and
a real prover P ′. We also learn that for the real verifier the completeness and
soundness are the same as for the complex verifier.
The remaining property to show is that for any real polynomially sized real
circuit W ′, which interacts with P ′ and outputs a state ρ′ there is another real,
polynomially sized circuit U ′ which outputs a state σ′ for which ||ρ′ − σ′||1 ≤ c.
We will first construct a complex W which interacts with P to produce a state
ρ and use the property of QSZK that there exists a polynomially sized circuit
U which outputs σ such that ||ρ− σ|| ≤ c. There are two cases to argue, when
P sends the first message, and when W sends the first message. From this we
construct a real U ′ that outputs the required σ′.
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Before we analyze the two cases, we first consider the structure of P ′. To
this end, we apply V †Q1 to each of P
′’s operations, after which they have the
form
V †Q1M
′VQ1 = |0〉〈0|Q1 ⊗M + |1〉〈1|Q1 ⊗M∗ (67)
where M is P ’s original operation. Measuring in the iVQ1ZQ1V
†
Q1 = YQ1 eigen-
basis thus commutes with each of P ′’s operations. In the following we may thus
imagine that Q1 has been measured in this basis.
Let us for a moment not trace out Q1 and keep it along with the verifier’s
output qubits. Conjugating this state by V †Q1 we obtain a state
ρ′′ =
(
ρ0 0
0 ρ1
)
(68)
where we have taken the liberty of measuring Q1 in the YQ1 basis. (To be
clear, the verifier’s output state is ρ′ = ρ0 + ρ1.) The state was real before we
conjugate by VQ1 , i.e.
V †Q1
(
ρ0 0
0 ρ1
)
VQ1 =
1
2
(
ρ0 + ρ1 −i(ρ0 − ρ1)
i(ρ0 − ρ1) ρ0 + ρ1
)
(69)
is real. From this we deduce that ρ0 = ρ
∗
1 which we will rename ρ.
Now let us construct a cheating complex verifier that outputs ρ when in-
teracting with P . To this end we consider the interaction between P ′ and the
cheating real verifier, viewed in the V basis on Q1. We consider two cases.
Case 1: prover goes first In the first case the Prover sends the first
message. In this case P ′ would create an entangled pair of qubits Q1Q2 and
send Q2 to the verifier. Since measuring Q1 in the YQ1 basis commutes with all
operations lets suppose that this happens. In the case the outcome was 0 the
verifier’s qubit Q2 would be in the state |+i〉Q2 and P ′’s operations correspond
to those of P . For our complex cheating verifier, then, we simulate this process
by preparing a qubit in the state |+i〉Q2 and proceeding just as the real cheating
verifier would, interacting with P . This produces the state ρ.
Case 2: verifier goes first In the second case the verifier sends the first
message to the prover. Let |ψ′〉 = |0〉Q1 |ψ0〉 + |1〉Q1 |ψ1〉 be the cheating real
verifier’s state immediately before sending the first message, where the qubit
Q1 is sent to the prover for the simulation. Changing basis by VQ1 this becomes
VQ1 |ψ′〉 = |0〉Q1 |ψ〉+ |1〉Q1 |ψ∗〉 (70)
where |ψ〉 = |ψ0〉 + i|ψ1〉. Note that by lemma 5 there is an efficient method
of preparing |ψ〉. Now suppose that we measure Q1 in the YQ1 basis. If the
outcome is 0 then the real prover behaves as P and the verifier’s state is |ψ〉.
For the cheating complex prover, then, we simply prepare |ψ〉 as the verifier’s
initial state (dropping the unneeded qubitQ1) and proceed as in the real verifier,
interacting with P . The output state is then ρ.
We have shown that in all cases there is a cheating complex verifier that
interacts with P to produce ρ. By complex conjugating, we obtain a cheating
complex verifier that interacts with P ∗ to produce ρ∗.
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We now use the property of the complex problem in QSZK that there is
a polynomially sized circuit U which outputs a state σ so that ||ρ− σ|| ≤ c.
We construct a polynomially sized real circuit U ′ by applying the real sim-
ulation R(·) to each gate in the circuit. Hence a gate M is replaced with
M ′ = V †Q2 (|0〉〈0| ⊗M + |1〉〈1| ⊗M∗). The qubit Q2 is prepared in the state
I/2. The output of this circuit is then σ′′, and when conjugated by VQ2 it is
VQ2σ
′′V †Q2 =
1
2
(
σ 0
0 σ∗
)
with ||ρ′′ − σ′′|| ≤ c. Tracing out Q2 gives a state σ′
such that ||ρ′ − σ′|| ≤ c since the trace norm is decreasing under partial trace.
Hence there is a real circuit which outputs a state that is close to ρ′.
4 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that a wide variety of important quantum complexity
classes are unchanged when the quantum operations are restricted to be over a
real Hilbert space. The arguments that we use are quite general and could be
applied to other complexity classes as well.
Acknoledgements This work is funded by the Centre for Quantum Tech-
nologies, which is funded by the Singapore Ministry of Education and the Sin-
gapore National Research Foundation. Thanks to Bill Rosgen for helpful dis-
cussions.
References
[AB09] Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak. Computational Complexity, A Mod-
ern Approach. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[HM10] Aram Harrow and Ashley Montanaro. An efficient test for product
states, with applications to quantum merlin-arthur games. In Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010, pp. 633 – 642, January
2010. doi:10.1109/FOCS.2010.66. eprint arXiv:1001.0017.
[KM03] Hirotada Kobayashi and Keiji Matsumoto. Quantum multi-
prover interactive proof systems with limited prior entanglement.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 66(3):429–450, 2003.
doi:10.1016/S0022-0000(03)00035-7. eprint arXiv:cs.CC/0102013.
[KMY01] Hirotada Kobayashi, Keiji Matsumoto, and Tomoyuki Yamakami.
Quantum certificate verification: Single versus multiple quantum cer-
tificates, October 2001. eprint arXiv:quant-ph/0110006.
[McK10] Matthew McKague. Quantum Information Processing with Adversar-
ial Devices. PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, June 2010. eprint
arXiv:1006.2352, url http://hdl.handle.net/10012/5259.
18
[MM11] Matthew McKague and Michele Mosca. Generalized self-testing and
the security of the 6-state protocol. In Wim van Dam, Vivien
Kendon, and Simone Severini, editors, Theory of Quantum Computa-
tion, Communication, and Cryptography, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, volume 6519, pp. 113–130. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2011. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-18073-6 10. eprint arXiv:1006.0150.
[MMG09] Matthew McKague, Michele Mosca, and Nicolas Gisin. Simulating
quantum systems using real hilbert spaces. Physical Review Letters,
102(2):020505, 2009. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.102.020505. eprint
arXiv:0810.1923.
[NC00] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information. Cambridge University Press, October 2000.
[Wat99] John Watrous. Pspace has 2-round quantum interactive proof
systems. In Proceedings of IEEE FOCS’99, January 1999.
doi:10.1109/SFFCS.1999.814643. eprint arXiv:cs.CC/9901015.
[Wat00] J. Watrous. Succinct quantum proofs for properties of finite groups.
In Foundations of Computer Science, 2000., pp. 537 –546, 2000.
doi:10.1109/SFCS.2000.892141. eprint arXiv:cs.CC/0009002.
[Wat02] John Watrous. Limits on the power of quantum statistical zero-
knowledge. In Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2002, pp. 459 –
468, February 2002. doi:10.1109/SFCS.2002.1181970. eprint
arXiv:quant-ph/0202111.
[Wat09] John Watrous. Zero-knowledge against quantum attacks. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 39(1):25–58, 2009. doi:10.1137/060670997.
eprint arXiv:quant-ph/0511020.
A The single party real simulation is not suffi-
cient to show QIP(k) ⊆ QIPR(k).
Suppose we make the following argument: the prover and verifier take turns
performing operations, so we really only need one “extra” qubit, and they can
pass it back and forth along with the messages. We can thus transform the
states and all operations according to R(·). Clearly the completeness is the
same, but what about soundness? Here we give an example problem with an
instance not in the language where in the original protocol the verifier accepts
with probability arbitrarily close to 0, but for the real simulation with only one
“extra” qubit there is a cheating prover that forces the verifier to always accept.
The problem we consider is quantum state distinguishability. This is a com-
plete problem for the class QSZK [Wat02]. We are given two efficient quantum
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circuits Q0 and Q1 that produce outputs ρ1 and ρ2 after tracing out non-output
qubits, and the promise that either
||ρ1 − ρ2||1 ≤ α (71)
or
||ρ1 − ρ2||1 ≥ β (72)
with α, β ∈ [0, 1] and α < β2. The problem is to determine which of these is
true. The basic solution to this problem is to prepare one of ρ0 or ρ1 at random
and send it to the verifier. The prover attempts to decide which state was sent,
and sends a guess to the verifier. The verifier the checks whether the prover was
correct. If the prover is very often correct over many instances of this game,
then the states must be far apart in the trace norm and the verifier accepts. If
the states are close together then the prover will be correct about half of the
time and the verifier rejects.2
Now we consider two unitaries U0 and U1 which differ only in their global
phase. In particular, U0|0 . . . 0〉 = iU1|0 . . . 0〉. Clearly the two states must
be completely indistinguishable since ρ0 = ρ1. However, if we apply the real
simulation and pass the “extra” qubit to the prover, the states are orthogonal
and the prover can distinguish them perfectly! Indeed, according to lemma 1
R(〈0 . . . 0|U †0 )R(U1|0 . . . 0〉) = 〈0 . . . 0|U †0U1|0 . . . 0〉
= Re i
= 0.
A closer inspection reveals that R(U0|0 . . . 0〉) = (X⊗ I)R(U1|0 . . . 0〉). Thus
the prover needs only to measure the “extra” qubit in the Z basis to distinguish
the states. The reason that the previous proof fails for this construction is
that the prover’s measurement on the “extra” qubit does not commute with
measurement in the V †ZV basis, so we can no longer view the verifier’s actions
as a mixture of the original and complex conjugate protocols (they share the
“extra” qubit). In the construction with two “extra” qubits the verifier keeps
one qubit, so all operations, both the verifier’s and the prover’s, commute with
measurement in the V †ZV basis.
2 A more sophisticated argument involves first amplifying to obtain a pair of circuits with
α close to 0 and β close to 1 and then playing the game once. Then completeness is close 1,
soundness is close to 1
2
and only two messages are required. See Watrous [Wat02] for details.
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